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PING! 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CELLULAR RECORDS TO TRACK 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On a cold night in November, Defendant went to a friend’s house to play a 
game of poker.1 At some point during that game, two of the six friends began 
arguing with Defendant over cheating. Defendant claimed that he then left for 
home and, at that time, all his friends were still alive. For the rest of the night, 
Defendant claimed he was at home with his girlfriend. His girlfriend even 
corroborated that story, but Defendant’s cell phone told a different story. 
According to the cell phone, Defendant went back to the friend’s house for 
several minutes, drove all across town to a deserted field for quite a few more 
minutes, and finally went home. 
In reality, one of Defendant’s friends was killed while Defendant’s cell 
phone was at the friend’s house. Worse, the victim’s body was found in a burnt 
car in the same abandoned field the cell phone says Defendant was for several 
minutes. Nothing else places Defendant at either location during the estimated 
time frames. At trial, no physical evidence was presented, nor did any 
witnesses testify Defendant was there. The only witness that testified was a 
police officer. This police officer’s only task was to explain the cell phone’s 
story using the cellular records. He placed dots on a map where the cell phone 
“pinged” information off these elusive things called cell towers. However, the 
police officer did not know what a cell tower was; he had no idea how it 
worked; and he did not know which accuracy errors are often present. The 
police officer testified, and the Defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 
Currently there are over six billion cell phone subscriptions.2 This means 
there are almost as many cell phone subscriptions as there are people in the 
world.3 In fact, about 35 percent of households in the United States only have a 
 
 1. The events described here are similar but not exactly like State of Missouri v. Jerome 
Williams, No. 1022-CR06040-01 (2012) (still on appeal). See St. Louis- Man is charged in 
slaying, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 2010, at A3. 
 2. World Has About 6 Billion Cell Phone Subscribers, According To U.N. Telecom Agency 
Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/cell-
phones-world-subscribers-six-billion_n_1957173.html. 
 3. Id. 
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wireless phone, a figure that has more than doubled in the last five years.4 As 
cell phone usage continues to grow, cell phone carriers have developed and 
built more sophisticated cellular towers in order to meet demands.5 At the same 
time, cell phones have become a very useful tool for law enforcement 
agencies.6 Since people, like Defendant above, carry their cell phones 
everywhere and now use them for so many different tasks,7 law enforcement 
agencies have begun using this information for a wide range of investigative 
tasks.8 One common task, illustrated above, is to use the cell phone as a 
tracking device.9 In fact, under demands from Congress during recent 
Congressional hearings, cell phone carriers have reported a staggering 1.3 
million demands for their customers’ information in 2011 alone.10 While these 
numbers are certainly startling and raise significant privacy concerns, for a 
criminal defendant, the concerns have a far more substantial impact.11 
As law enforcement agencies request this information more and more, in 
turn, lawyers have begun using this information in trial more and more.12 
According to criminal defense attorney Mark Geragos, these cellular records 
have become “one of the most important developments in technology in the 
courtroom in the last five years.”13 With the influx of cellular location 
information in trial, a wide array of questions are raised, and courts are 
struggling to answer them, often coming to conflicting and confusing 
conclusions.14 Should these records be admissible evidence in trial?15 And, 
even if admitted for a limited purpose, should only an expert be permitted to 
testify on the meaning of the cellular records?16 
 
 4. Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA: THE WIRELESS ASS’N, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/re 
search/index.cfm/aid/10323 (last visited May 22, 2014). 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 68–77. 
 6. Eric Lichtblau, Police Are Using Phone Tracking as a Routine Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 
2012, at A1 (stating law enforcement tracking of cellphones has become “a powerful and widely 
used surveillance tool for local police officials, with hundreds of departments, large and small, 
often using it aggressively with little or no court oversight . . . .”). 
 7. Chuck Jones, What Do People Use Their Cell Phones For Besides Phone Calls?, 
FORBES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckjones/2012/11/29/what-do-people-
use-their-cell-phones-for-beside-phone-calls/. 
 8. Lichtblau, supra note 6, at A20. 
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
 10. In fact some claim this is a conservative estimate while the actual figure is much more 
significant. Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
2012, at A1. 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. See infra Part V. 
 13. Martha Neil, Cell Phone Calls Can Make, Break Cases, ABA JOURNAL (Jul. 16, 2007), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/cell_phone_calls_can_make_break_case/. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 16. See infra Parts IV, V. 
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In order to answer these questions, this article will first provide 
background information, including what cellular technology can be used for 
tracking, what cell towers are, and finally, how cell signals (or “pings”) are 
translated into the caller’s location.17 Next, it will examine the constitutional 
and evidentiary arguments surrounding the admission of cellular technology.18 
Furthermore, given that most courts have now determined cellular records are 
admissible, this article will then examine the procedure for admitting cellular 
records as courts differ substantially on how to categorize this evidence—as 
either lay or expert testimony.19 As a result, this article will finally conduct a 
case study illustrating how these courts differ and their ultimate conclusions.20 
II.  THE SCIENCE OF CELL TOWERS 
There are the two main methods used in cellular tracking: global 
positioning systems (GPS) and cell site data. While this article will focus on 
the usage of historical cell site data, it is important to first explain the other 
common cellular tracking method, GPS, and why the potentially more accurate 
option is most often unavailable. This will be followed by a discussion on cell 
towers, including how they operate and, specifically, how a cellular signal is 
turned into an estimate location. Finally, this section will examine the various 
factors influencing the accuracy of the locations and new technology’s impact 
on these factors. 
A. What Cellular Information Can Be Used for Tracking? 
There are two main methods of cellular tracking: (1) Global Positioning 
Systems and (2) cell site data—which include both real-time and historical 
data.21 Global positioning systems, or GPS, are a satellite-based navigation 
system quickly growing in popularity.22 There, a receiver on the satellite picks 
up a signal delivered from a GPS chip in the cellular phone.23 The delivery 
speed is then converted into distance24 giving a very accurate reading of the 
 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
 21. Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular Site Data to 
Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 7 (2011). 
 22. Adam Koppel, Warranting A Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law 
Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1061, 1063–64 (2010). 
 23. Richard B. Langley, In Simple Terms, How Does GPS Work?, UNIV. OF NEW 
BRUNSWICK (Feb. 16, 2008), http://gge.unb.ca/Resources/HowDoesGPSWork.html; Koppel, 
supra note 22, at 1063. 
 24. Koppel, supra note 22, at 1063 (stating “this process of determining a position from 
measurements of distances is known as trilateration (as opposed to triangulation)”). 
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cell phone’s location.25 However, while almost 90 percent of the U.S. 
population has a cell phone, only about one in six of those phones have GPS 
capabilities.26 Further, GPS is generally only capable of tracking a location 
when the cell user is explicitly using a location-based application on the 
phone.27 Lastly, even GPS has potential pitfalls: the largest being that it is 
reliable only when the phone is in view of the satellites used to run GPS.28 
Consequently, not only is GPS completely unavailable for a large portion of 
the population, but for those that do have GPS capability, it is dependent on the 
carrier’s usage and location at that specific time. 
Secondly, both real-time cell site data and historical cell site data use 
cellular technology to locate the cell user. While they are extremely similar, 
they differ in the time the signal, or “ping,” received and recorded by a tower is 
observed.29 Real-time cell site data is obtained through viewing the cell 
phone’s activity and signals in real time, meaning at that instant.30 Thus, this 
largely happens when police officers survey a particular cell phone’s 
activity.31 On the other hand, historical cell site data, the issue discussed in this 
article, is information obtained after the cell phone’s activity is recorded using 
the cell companies’ records of that activity.32 However, the question remains: 
how do these towers record and translate “pings”? And further, how do those 
“pings” then become location information? In order to answer these questions, 
it is necessary to discuss what a cell tower is and the technology that is used to 
turn signals into locations: both triangulation and the simpler “mapping” 
process. 
 
 25. Blank, supra note 21, at 7 (stating GPS tracking is accurate up to just a few meters). This 
accuracy has recently been brought into question. See Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance 
(GPS) Act: Hearing on H.R. 2168 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6–7 (2012) [hereinafter Statement of Professor 
Matt Blaze] (statement of Professor Matt Blaze). 
 26. Martin A. Dolan et al., Improving Your Criminal Practice: Use of Cell Phone Records 
and GPS Tracking, 24 CBA REC. 38, 39 (2010). 
 27. Statement of Professor Matt Blaze, supra note 25, at 10–11. 
 28. Id. at 12. 
 29. Blank, supra note 21, at 8. 
 30. See Kyle Malone, The Fourth Amendment and the Store Communications Act: Why the 
Warrantless Gathering of Historical Cell Site Location Information Poses No Threat to Privacy, 
39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 710 (2012). 
 31. Id. at 710. 
 32. Id.; Kevin McLaughlin, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: 
Where Are We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 431 (2007). 
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B. What Are Cellular Towers? 
Cell phones are like two-way radios.33 They require a transceiver to 
transmit the phone calls, and those transceivers are called cell sites or cell 
towers.34 Cell towers are typically arranged in order to cover an area the shape 
of a hexagon, forming a structure that looks much like a honeycomb with the 
cell tower in the middle of three different hexagonal areas.35 This shape is 
better than other potential configurations, such as a circle, as it allows the 
towers to leave no area without service.36 Since cell phones, even those merely 
on “on-mode” transmit a signal every seven seconds and continue to scan all 
the surrounding towers for the one with the strongest signal,37 the basic 
structure of the towers needs to accommodate the potential inflow and outflow 
of signals at all times.38 
Furthermore, with the annual number of minutes used at an all-time high of 
over 2.3 trillion and the annual number of text messages at over 2.2 trillion, 
cell towers are receiving more and more cell “pings”39 every year.40 As a 
result, there are a vast number of cell sites in the United States, and more are 
manufactured every year.41 As of June 2012, there were over 280,000 cell sites 
in the United States.42 This was an increase of about 75,000 cell towers, or 27 
percent, over the past five years and an increase of about 155,000 cell towers, 
or 55 percent, over the past ten years.43 The more urban and populated areas 
have more cell towers to accommodate the traffic, while rural areas have far 
fewer towers, covering much more distance—potentially even thirty miles.44 
 
 33. 3 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING; 
SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 28:2. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.; S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 9 (1986). 
 36. See Tom Farley & Mark van der Hoek, Cellular Telephone Basics, PRIVATELINE (Jan. 1, 
2006), http://www.privateline.com/mt_cellbasics (demonstrating the value of the hexagon shape 
in preventing no-service areas via diagrams). 
 37. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 33. 
 38. This process is called a “hand-off,” which is where one cell tower will “hand-off” the 
signal to another cell tower with a stronger signal, which allows for better service. Blank, supra 
note 21, at 5. 
 39. See Commonwealth v. Pitt, No. 2010-0061, 2012 WL 927095, at *1 (Mass. Supp. Feb. 
23, 2012). 
 40. See Wireless Quick Facts, supra note 4. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Urban areas could have a cell tower every one-half to one mile, while rural areas could 
have a single tower covering an area of three to five miles. Blank, supra note 21, at 4–5. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
492 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII:487 
C. How Do These “Pings” Turn into Locations? 
In order for these cell towers to be useful in trial, the pings and records 
need to be able to provide location information. Triangulation is one of the 
common methods of locating the cell phone and it offers a “fair degree of 
precision.”45 This method is particularly common in urban and suburban areas 
as it is only possible when a cellular phone pings off two or more towers 
simultaneously.46 Multiple towers are necessary to complete the triangle 
between the cell phone itself and the other two towers.47 From this triangle 
connection, trigonometry and a mathematical equation are used to position the 
cell phone’s distance from the other two towers.48 The denser the cell sites are, 
the more accurate the location reading will be.49 This is true for two main 
reasons: first, the closer the towers are together, the smaller the triangle 
between the towers and the cell phone will be, thus affording less potential for 
error; and second, the closer the towers are, the more likely they overlap in 
area coverage, which in turn results in more triangles allowing for triangulation 
of the cell phone.50 
While triangulation is common, it is not the only method of determining 
the location of a phone. What is most often the source of contention, and the 
focus of this article, is a simple mapping system.51 This is where someone, 
often the detective in criminal trials52 or a records custodian from the cellular 
company,53 takes historical cell tower records and makes a map of the calls and 
the towers that received those calls.54 This is all based on a belief that a call 
will ping to the tower that is closest to the cell phone.55 Thus, by mapping the 
towers which accepted the specific calls, one can locate the general vicinity of 
 
 45. In re Application of the U.S. for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on A Certain 
Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 46. Id. at 451–52. 
 47. Id. at n.3. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Blank, supra note 21, at 9. 
 50. See Blank, supra note 21, at 8–9; Langley, supra note 23 (explaining triangulation and 
GPS trilateration in greater detail). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d 949, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2012); United 
States v. Kale, 445 F. App’x 482, 485–86 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Feliciano, 300 F. 
App’x 795, 800–01 (11th Cir. 2008); State v. Robinson, 724 N.W.2d 35, 61–62 (Neb. 2006); 
Malone v. State, 73 So. 3d 1197, 1201 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011); Perez v. State, 980 So. 2d 1126, 
1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 52. Tetso v. State, 45 A.3d 788, 797 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012); Kansas v. Fleming, No. 
106, 104, 2012 WL 4794560, at *3 (Kan. App. Oct. 5, 2012); Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 180 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). 
 53. State v. Wright, No. 08–1737, 2010 WL 200052, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2010); 
Woodward v. State, CR-08-0145, 2011 WL 6278294, at *14 (Ala. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2011). 
 54. Woodward, CR-08-0145, 2011 WL 6278294, at *14. 
 55. Id. 
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the caller.56 However, this belief has one large fundamental flaw: cell signals 
go to the tower with the strongest signal, which is not always the cell tower 
geographically closest to the cell phone.57 
In fact, an extensive list of factors can affect signal strength of a cellular 
tower beyond the location of the cell phone.58 First, various technical 
characteristics can affect signal strength.59 These factors include the technical 
characteristics of the cell sites themselves, such as the number of sites 
available, the maintenance or repairs being performed, the height of the cell 
tower, the height of the cell tower above sea level, the wattage output, and 
finally, the range of coverage.60 Further, technical characteristics of the 
antennas on the cellular sites may also have an effect.61 These antenna factors 
include the number of antennas on the cell tower, the angle and direction the 
antenna is facing, the height of each antenna, and the call traffic processed 
through each antenna.62 The last technical characteristic that can affect signal 
strength is the technical aspects of the phone itself.63 These include both the 
wattage output and generation of the phone’s broadband capability, essentially 
the age of the phone.64 Even beyond these twelve factors surrounding the 
technical aspects, environmental and geographical factors, such as weather, 
topography, and urban development can have significant effects on the signal 
strength.65 Additionally, the location of those using a cellular phone, either 
indoor or outdoor, can also affect signal strength.66 Even the time of day can 
affect signal strength as calls during rush hours can be redirected due to 
overcrowded towers.67 
D. How Accurate is Mapping? 
This vast list begins to demonstrate the potential accuracy problems with 
tracking a person using cell tower data, specifically when the method is 
mapping rather than triangulation. However, some experts, specifically 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Blank, supra note 21, at 5–6. 
 58. Id. at 6. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Blank, supra note 21, at 6. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 7. 
 67. Anemona Hartocollis, When the Trill of a Cellphone Brings the Clang of Prison Doors, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at B1. 
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Professor Matthew Blaze,68 say the rapid growth of cellular popularity may 
significantly improve the accuracy of cell tower data.69 As technology 
advances, the reliability of the towers has become greater.70 New technology 
even allows towers to pinpoint a cellular phone’s longitude and latitude by 
“correlating the precise time and angle at which a given device’s signal arrives 
at multiple sector base stations.”71 Beyond these technological advances, as 
cellular companies continue to build towers to meet rising demand, the towers 
continue to cover smaller and smaller areas, thus increasing the accuracy of the 
data.72 In fact, some towers are now designed simply to cover a few levels of 
one building, and, therefore, it would be possible to pinpoint not only the 
general location but also the specific floor where from which the call was 
made.73 It is true the trend towards more advanced and smaller towers has 
grown in urban areas while the more rural areas remain largely the same with 
large towers covering as much area as possible.74 However, almost 80 percent 
of the U.S. population lives in an urban area,75 and crime often localizes in 
urban areas.76 Consequently, quite often “it is no longer valid to assume that 
the cell [tower] will give only an approximate indication of a user’s 
location.”77 
Even given these technological advances, defense attorneys continue to 
argue the cellular records present too many accuracy issues.78 However, 
determining the weight and accuracy of evidence are decisions for a jury, not a 
judge.79 For example, when witness testimony at trial is inconsistent with 
 
 68. Professor Matt Blaze has a PhD in Computer Science, an MA in Computer Science from 
Princeton University, an MA in Computer Science from Columbia University, and a BS from City 
University of New York Hunter College. He currently teaches Computer and Information Science 
at the University of Pennsylvania and specializes in computer security, cryptograph, network 
communications, and surveillance technology. See Matthew Blaze, UNIV. OF PENN.: ENG’G, 
http://www.seas.upenn.edu/directory/profile.php?lD=8 (last visited May 22, 2014). 
 69. Statement of Professor Matt Blaze, supra note 25, at 12. 
 70. Id. at 19. 
 71. Id. at 16. 
 72. The smaller the area a tower covers, the more reliable the tower is. Thus, as Blaze argues, 
the more towers there are, the more reliable cellular data is. Id. at 13–18. 
 73. Id. at 15. 
 74. Id. 
 75. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. Population Living in Urban vs. 
Rural Areas, http:/www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/census_issues/archives/metropolitan_planning/ 
cps2k.cfm (last visited May 22, 2014). 
 76. See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 307: CRIMES AND CRIME RATES BY TYPE 
AND GEOGRAPHIC COMMUNITY: 2009 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ 
tables/12s0307.pdf. 
 77. Statement of Professor Matthew Blaze, supra note 25, at 20. 
 78. United States v. Fama, No.12-CR-186 (WFK), 2012 WL 6102700, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 
10, 2012). 
 79. Schiebert v. State, 451 P.2d 15, 17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969). 
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previous testimony, a jury decides whether that witness testimony is accurate. 
A jury then decides, given any accuracy issues, how much weight to give that 
evidence. Similarly, a jury should decide the accuracy of cellular records in 
establishing a caller’s location. The location of the caller is a question of fact, 
not of law. Thus, while it remains true that a call pinging off tower A does not 
always mean the caller was located near tower A,80 these accuracy issues 
should not be grounds for preventing the cell records’ admission into evidence. 
As a result, these disputes about location should be made by the finder of fact. 
Thus, they are best left in closing arguments before a jury rather than motions 
in limine before a judge. 
Still, these new technological advances raise a different problem as many 
argue cellular records and mapping testimony should be limited to experts. 
However, before that more highly debated argument is addressed, it is 
important to examine more preliminary constitutional and evidentiary hurdles. 
Therefore, this article will next examine the constitutional arguments for 
excluding cellular records, focusing on the Sixth and Fourth Amendments. 
That will be followed by an examination of the two evidentiary arguments for 
exclusion which the courts are rejecting: relevance and hearsay. 
III.  THE ARGUMENTS COURTS REJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL & EVIDENTIARY 
Surrounding the usage of cellular records is a wide array of potential 
arguments against admission of the records into evidence. These arguments 
can be generally grouped into two classifications: constitutional issues and 
evidentiary issues. Nonetheless, most of these arguments face certain failure or 
are simply ignored by the courts. In the following section, the constitutional 
arguments of the Sixth and Fourth Amendments are examined. That analysis is 
followed by a discussion of the evidentiary issues of relevancy and hearsay. 
A. What Constitutional Arguments Must Cellular Records Overcome? 
1. Cellular Records Present No Confrontation Issue Since They are a 
Valid Business Record 
There is a wide range of arguments surrounding the admission of cell 
tower records into court, and two such arguments are based on constitutional 
grounds. First, the Confrontation Clause, located in the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, states that a criminal defendant has the right “to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him.”81 The Supreme Court held in 
Crawford v. Washington that this amendment conferred the procedural right of 
 
 80. Statement of Professor Matt Blaze, supra note 25, at 12–13, 18–19. 
 81. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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cross-examination of testimonial statements for a criminal defendant.82 
Further, while “testimonial” has proven to be a confusing term, the Supreme 
Court held that a hearsay statement properly admitted as a business record83 
does not qualify as a “testimonial” statement.84 In United States v. Yeley-Davis, 
the Tenth Circuit established that cellular business records specifically present 
no Confrontation Clause issue.85 
2. Obtaining Cellular Records is Not a Search as there is No Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy 
Many argue these records are obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and, as such, are unconstitutional searches. This issue is more 
uncertain since the federal courts have had difficulty applying the Katz test to 
the present issue.86 In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court established 
there is no Fourth Amendment protection when there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.87 In a series of cases following this decision, the 
Supreme Court has held in many instances there is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy when a person voluntarily provides information to a third party.88 
More specifically, the Supreme Court, in Smith v. Maryland, authorized pen 
registers without a search warrant, allowing police to obtain every number 
dialed from a cell phone.89 The court reasoned that privacy is lost when the 
caller chooses to make a call, thus allowing the cell phone company to use that 
now public information.90 
However, the issue with cell site data is more complicated than disclosure 
of a phone number as many argue making a phone call does not demonstrate a 
 
 82. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60–61 (2004) (reversing the previous reliability 
test from Ohio v. Roberts as too amorphous and establishing a procedural guarantee of a 
defendant’s right to cross-examine any testimonial statements). 
 83. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 84. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
 85. United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673, 678 (10th Cir. 2011). It seems, however, 
that evidence that could indicate a defendant’s location would also indicate a right to confront the 
cellular company. 
 86. Blank, supra note 21, at 39–41. 
 87. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 88. See generally United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 
416 U.S. 21 (1974); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735 (1979). 
 89. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 745. 
 90. See id. at 744–45. Note that while Smith v. Maryland authorizes such pen registrations 
without a warrant, federal statute prohibits it. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 
1002(a)(2) (2006); In re Application of the U.S. for Prospective Cell Site Location Information 
On A Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 460–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Transmission 
by a Wireless Carrier of Information Regarding a Cellular Phone User’s Physical Location to 
Public Safety Organizations, 20 Op. O.L.C. 315, 317–18 (1996). 
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person intended to disclose their location every time their phone pings off a 
tower. Thus, the question becomes: while the numbers dialed from a phone are 
not private, does the same rule apply the caller’s location? Due to the Supreme 
Court’s silence thus far on this issue,91 the district courts are coming to 
conflicting results.92 While a small number of courts hold there is no such 
voluntary transfer of location information,93 the majority of district courts have 
instead held that there is no Fourth Amendment violation by obtaining these 
cellular records.94 In United States v. Benford, the court provided an extensive 
review, explaining that historical cell site data is similar to pen registrations 
and banking records in that the caller voluntarily used the equipment and, 
therefore, ran the risk that the call records would be given to police.95 
Consequently, the majority of jurisdictions hold that obtaining cellular records 
is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
B. Are Cellular Records Irrelevant Hearsay? 
1. Cellular Records are Relevant to Prove a Defendant’s Location 
There are many arguments for keeping potentially inaccurate historical cell 
site records out of trial, and a large portion of these arguments circle around 
evidentiary issues. As with all evidentiary issues, the first hurdle is relevancy.96 
At first glance, there would not appear to be any relevancy issues with these 
cell tower records as they certainly have some “tendency to prove” the 
defendant’s location.97 However, it is important to remember that “if the phone 
 
 91. The Supreme Court recently began addressing cellular tracking concerns. The case, 
however, centered on GPS tracking and the illegal plantation of the GPS tracking device. 
Therefore, it would appear that decision will not offer significant guidance for obtaining cellular 
records. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 92. Blank, supra note 21, at 39–41. 
 93. In re Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 837–38 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (focusing 
on the extra protections afforded to homes from unreasonable searches and holding the cell 
records often came from the home, thus violating this protection), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Dye, No. 1:10CR221, 2011 WL 1595255 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 
2011); United States v. Velasquez, No. CR08-0730 WHA, 2010 WL 4286276 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 
2010); United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010); 
United States v. Suarez–Blanca, No. 1:07-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 
21, 2008); In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007); United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 
384, 389 (D. Md. 2012). 
 95. Benford, 2010 WL 1266507, at *2. 
 96. Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr., The Evidence Rules Every New Trial Lawyer Should Know, 
36 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 3, 4 (Summer 2010). 
 97. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which has been adopted by many states, a piece of 
evidence is relevant if it: (a) has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable; and (b) is a 
fact of consequence. FED. R. EVID. 401(a)–(b). 
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is not surgically implanted,” it is impossible to prove that the defendant had the 
phone on him.98 While the records are relevant if they can prove the 
defendant’s general location at a key time, they are most likely irrelevant if 
they only show where the defendant’s phone was located.99 
Specifically, in cases of pre-paid cellular phones, the question of who had 
the phone becomes even more clouded. Because pre-paid cell phones do not 
require a contract,100 they are commonly bought using a fake name, making 
them useful in committing crimes.101 Moreover, prepaid phone carriers target 
low income customers102 who may find a “monthly bill . . . not practical.”103 
Considering there is a long established correlation between socio-economic 
status and crime,104 the argument is that pre-paid cell phones present a larger 
relevancy concern than the annual contractual cell phones. However, those 
making this argument appear to have missed a crucial point: simply by 
obtaining the cellular records, it becomes clear whether the phone is pre-paid 
or a contractual phone. It is then easy to see how a detective, or anyone 
conducting a reasonable investigation, could verify who actually had 
possession of the phone by contacting other numbers in the records. Still, in 
cases where the cell phone is confiscated at arrest, the phones themselves are 
obtained from the defendant.105 Thus, in many cases, the argument that the 
defendant was not in possession of the phone runs rather thin. Still, courts 
confronted with direct testimony raising this precise issue have not used 
relevancy as a basis for their review of the evidentiary issue, thus 
demonstrating the unlikelihood of success relevancy arguments hold.106 
 
 98. Hartocollis, supra note 67, at B2 (quoting Jeff M. Fischbach, “an electronic evidence 
analyst and chief executive of Second Wave, a consulting firm”); 3 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, 
WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 28:12. 
 99. Blank, supra note 21, at 14. 
 100. Arthur Hughes, Glossary of Telecom Marketing Terms, DATABASE MKTG. INST., 
http://www.dbmarketing.com/2010/03/glossary-of-telecom-marketing-terms/ (last visited May 
22, 2014). 
 101. Blank, supra note 21, at 15–16. 
 102. Mark E. Budnitz et al., Deceptive Claims for Prepaid Telephone Cards and the Need for 
Regulation, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 42 (2006). 
 103. Christopher Soghoian, Caveat Venditor: Technologically Protected Subsidized Goods 
and the Customers Who Hack Them, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 46, 58 (2007). 
 104. See generally Lacey McLaughlin, The Poverty-Crime Connection, JACKSON FREE PRESS 
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2011/oct/19/the-poverty-crime-connec 
tion/. 
 105. Compare Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 179 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) with People v. 
Roby, No. 301608, 2011 WL 5067252, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011). 
 106. In State v. Hayes, No. M2008–02689–CCA–R3–CD, 2010 WL 5344882, at *6 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2010), the detective who introduced the historical cell site mapping evidence 
admitted the “cell phone records did not show who was actually using the phone in question.” 
The court, however, went on to hold there was no error by the trial court in admitting the 
evidence, not on relevancy grounds, instead based on the proper lay opinion of testimony. Id. at 
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Consequently, an argument against the relevancy of this historical cell site data 
holds little water, both in theory and with the courts. 
2. Cellular Records are Valid Business Records 
One other possible argument, albeit very weak, is a hearsay objection. 
However, numerous cases have held historical cell site records are admissible 
hearsay under the business records exception.107 This exception provides for 
admission of business records if: the record was made near the time the 
information was transmitted by someone with knowledge; the record was kept 
in course of regularly conducted activity of business; making the records was 
regular business practice; and the information does not lack trustworthiness.108 
It is well established that cell phone records are recorded as the cell towers 
receive the information, and thus are contemporaneous records.109 Hearsay 
arguments on the admission of cellular records stem largely from the purpose 
for which they are recorded and kept by the cellular companies. If a document 
is kept solely for potential usage at trial, it is believed to lack trustworthiness 
and, therefore, falls outside the business records exception.110 Still, while one 
potential usage may be to locate and track the defendant, cellular companies 
have very legitimate business reasons for maintaining the information.111 Cell 
phone companies need this information simply to bill customers properly and 
to track call volume.112 Because of these legitimate, non-trial related purposes 
for recording, courts have rarely excluded cellular records due to hearsay.113 
Accordingly, the historical cell site records are legitimate business records and 
hearsay arguments face very little chance of success. 
IV.  THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LAY & EXPERT TESTIMONY 
While both relevancy and hearsay have been argued, neither argument 
holds much possibility of success.114 However, there remains one potential 
 
*10. And although the court mentions the detective’s testimony, it does not appear a claim of 
irrelevancy was used as grounds for reversal. See id. 
 107. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 108. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 109. See Blank, supra note 21, at 8. 
 110. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943). 
 111. In re Application of the U.S. for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. On A Certain 
Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 928–29 (11th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Green, No. 10-10300, 2010 WL 3401485, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2010); United States v. 
Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673, 679 (10th Cir. 2011); Mikell v. Brian, No. CV409-171, 2010 WL 
6797007, at *25 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2010); Fry v. State, 885 N.E.2d 742, 747–49 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2008); State v. Hood, 984 N.E.2d 1057, 1065 (Ohio 2012). 
 114. See supra Part III.B. 
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evidentiary issue, and it is in this argument that the case law presents 
significant chaos and confusion.115 Most cases that dispute the usage of cellular 
records, dispute the records not because of their admission, but rather they 
dispute the way in which they are ultimately admitted.116 As a result of these 
disputes, the true question surrounding cellular records is: must an expert 
witness testify in order to properly admit cellular records into evidence? 
Consequently, to answer this question, the rules of evidence for both lay and 
expert testimony must be examined. This will be followed by an explanation of 
the importance in the distinction, specifically focusing on three concerns 
surrounding the distinction between lay and expert opinion. 
A. What is Lay Testimony vs. Expert Testimony? An Introduction 
1. Basic Requirements of Rules 701 and 702 
While each state can set their own rules for evidentiary concerns, and thus 
each have different rules on lay testimony and expert opinion, by and large the 
states model their rules after the Federal Rules of Evidence.117 The Federal 
Rules governing lay opinion and expert testimony are Rules 701 and 702.118 
First, in order for a lay witness’s testimony to be admissible, it must comply 
with three requirements: it must be rationally based upon the witness’s own 
perception; helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to 
determining a fact in issue; and not based on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge which is left within the scope of expert testimony.119 
On the other hand, in order to admit expert testimony, Rule 702 requires the 
evidence to be scientific, technical, or specialized.120 Further, there are several 
reliability requirements placed on the expert evidence: first, the testimony itself 
must be based on sufficient facts or data; second, the testimony must be based 
on reliable principles and methods; and third, the expert must have applied the 
principles and methods of the specialized information reliably to the present 
case.121 Additionally, the witness must be qualified as an expert witness 
through their knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.122 And 
 
 115. See infra Part V. 
 116. See infra Part V. 
 117. Paul F. Kirgis, A Legisprudential Analysis of Evidence Codification: Why Most Rules of 
Evidence Should Not Be Codified – But Privilege Law Should Be, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 809, 809 
(2004). 
 118. FED. R. EVID. 701–702. 
 119. FED. R. EVID. 701; Malone v. State, 70 So. 3d 1197, 1201 (Miss. App. 2011). 
 120. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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finally, just as lay testimony, an expert’s testimony must be helpful to the jury 
in deciding the issues of the case.123 
2. Both Lay & Expert Testimony Must Be Helpful to the Jury 
The evidence must first be “helpful” to the jury in that the evidence 
“helps” the trier of fact in understanding the issues or evidence submitted.124 
While this has been called the “touchstone” of Rule 702,125 the requirement 
also stems from basic relevancy requirements.126 If the expert’s testimony is 
not “helpful,” (i.e., it does not make any fact more or less probable) then it is 
not relevant and therefore inadmissible.127 However, as relevancy simply 
requires the evidence to have “any tendency” to make a fact more or less 
probable, this is not a difficult hurdle to either lay or expert testimony.128 
3. Specialized, Scientific, & Technical Information is Reserved to Expert 
Witnesses Only 
Once the evidence has been deemed “helpful,” the first step in 
distinguishing between lay and expert testimony is to determine what type of 
testimony will be offered—will the witness discuss something that is 
specialized, scientific, or technical? In order to facilitate answering this 
question, the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee, in a 2000 
amendment, cited State v. Brown,129 and provided that the “distinction between 
lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony ‘results from a process 
of reasoning familiar in everyday life,’ while expert testimony ‘results from a 
process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialist in the field.’”130 
Thus, while a lay witness can testify to things learned through their personal 
 
 123. Id.; BioCore, Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 183 F.R.D. 695, 699 (D. Kan. 1998) (stating “the 
touchstone of Fed.R.Evid. 702 . . . is the helpfulness of the expert testimony, i.e. whether it ‘will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’” (citing United 
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3rd Cir. 1985)). 
 124. BioCore, 183 F.R.D. at 699; FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 125. Biocore, 183 F.R.D. at 699. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 128. While “helpfulness” can present larger issues, this analysis will not focus on those issues 
as they are tangential to the purpose of this article—the admissibility and implications of cellular 
records. See Thompson v. State, No. 01-10-00398-CR, 2012 WL 668937, at *6–7 (Tex. App. 
Mar. 1, 2012); See also United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining 
the various factors used to examine the evidence’s assistance to the jury). 
 129. State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (Tenn. 1992). 
 130. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note; United States v. Kale, 445 F. App’x 482, 
485 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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experiences,131 those things learned only through specialized training must be 
left to the specialist and admitted through expert testimony.132 
4. Expert Testimony has Three Reliability Requirements 
Once the evidence is determined to be specialized testimony obtained 
through training, the testimony must be admitted through expert opinion. The 
next step will be to determine the reliability of the evidence, thus ensuring the 
expert evidence conforms to Rule 702’s restrictions.133 While there must be 
sufficient facts relied upon by the expert, and those facts must then be reliably 
applied to the present case,134 the more difficult burden lies with in 
determining the reliability of the specialized information itself.135 To determine 
if specialized knowledge is in fact reliable, courts hold one of two types of 
hearings.136 Either the court will conduct a Daubert Hearing137 or, for those 
states that have not chosen to adopt the new federal standard in Daubert,138 a 
Frye Hearing.139 The older standard used in Frye allows experts in the specific 
field to set the reliability standard by holding that if the expert’s approach is 
“generally accepted” within the field, it is sufficiently reliable.140 While many 
state courts continue to apply this “general acceptance” reliability standard,141 
all federal courts now apply Daubert’s standard.142 This reliability test sets the 
judge as “gatekeeper” and identifies several factors to be examined by the 
judge when determining reliability: whether the theory or technique has been 
 
 131. See infra Part IV.C. 
 132. Most arguments surrounding the admission of cellular records focus on this particular 
issue—is the evidence specialized, scientific, or technical. See infra Part V. 
 133. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 134. See FED. R. EVID. 703 for more information on what establishes that an expert has a 
sufficient factual basis. 
 135. FED. R. EVID. 702; See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993). 
 136. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. 
 137. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579 (establishing the rule determining the reliability of a 
specialized, scientific, or technical piece of evidence in federal courts); Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 138. Frye, 293 F. at 1013. While Daubert superseded Frye, many states still apply a Frye 
standard and therefore it is important to analyze. See, e.g., State v. Bigger, 254 P.3d 1142 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2011); King v. State, 89 So. 3d 209 (Fla. 2012); Butler v. Union Carbide Corp., 712 
S.E.2d 537 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); In re Girard, 294 P.3d 236 (Kan. 2013); Montgomery Mut. Ins. 
v. Chesson, 51 A.3d 18 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012); Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and 
Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012); Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27 (Pa. 2012). 
 139. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See, e.g., Bigger, 254 P.3d at 1142; King, 89 So. 3d at 209; Butler, 712 S.E.2d at 537; In 
re Girard, 294 P.3d at 236; Montgomery Mut. Ins., 51 A.3d at 18; Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 
N.W.2d at 150; Betz, 44 A.3d at 27. 
 142. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. 
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tested, whether it has been subject to peer review and publication, the 
technique’s error rate, the existence of standards controlling the technique’s 
application, and whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted 
in the relevant scientific community.143 The Supreme Court in Daubert was 
very clear in its reasoning that these factors must be flexible and must be 
examined carefully for each case.144 As both tests are meant to be applied 
subjectively, they have caused significant discourse among the courts.145 
5. Experts Must Qualify under Rule 702 
One more step to admitting expert testimony would be to qualify the 
witness as an expert.146 While this can be the center of some dispute,147 many 
witnesses can qualify as an expert.148 The rule states a witness can be qualified 
as an expert by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education . . . .”149 
Therefore, a person who has a doctorate in engineering will mostly likely be 
qualified to testify about the structure of a home, something that would not 
surprise most people. However, a construction worker, with no formal 
education, may, through his personal experiences, skill, knowledge, and 
training, be just as qualified to discuss the structure of a home.150 
In conclusion, the distinction between lay and expert opinion testimony 
under the evidentiary rules can be difficult. However, a step-by-step approach 
helps to clarify the different and various requirements in admitting each type of 
testimony. Thus, the process requires: first, the evidence must comply with 
relevancy standard and thus be helpful to the trier of fact; second, the 
information must be classified as specialized, scientific, or technical; and 
finally, if it is such evidence, one must ensure the evidence conforms to 
reliability standards. However, the question remains: why do courts care? Why 
is there so much importance placed on the type of witness who testifies? 
B. Why is the Distinction between Lay & Expert Testimony So Significant? 
There are many reasons why the distinction between lay and expert 
testimony is strictly upheld, but two initial reasons are the reliability 
 
 143. Id. at 592–94. 
 144. Id. at 594–95. 
 145. See generally Robert M. Whitney, A Practicing Lawyer’s Guide to the Application of 
Daubert and Kumho, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 241, 253 (1999) (discussing the numerous factors 
to be applied during a Daubert hearing and the increased pressure on the court to “screen” this 
evidence). 
 146. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 147. See infra Part IV.C. 
 148. See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
504 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII:487 
requirements placed on experts151 and the significance of expert testimony to 
jurors.152 One significant concern surrounding lay testimony is the absence of 
strict reliability requirements.153 Specifically, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Advisory Committee has remarked that the rules have “been amended to 
eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements [established for experts 
under] Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an 
expert in lay witness clothing.”154 While the reliability requirements for expert 
testimony can be difficult and tedious to comply with,155 they are there for a 
reason and cannot be avoided by disguising otherwise expert testimony using a 
lay witness.156 Another significant reason which distinguishes between lay and 
expert testimony is the potential impact expert witnesses can have on a jury.157 
Since experts can exhibit a substantial amount of influence over juries simply 
by their very nature as experts, they have the potential to unduly influence a 
jury.158 Therefore, distinguishing a witness as lay or expert holds great weight 
in trial both because lay testimony does not have the same reliability 
safeguards as expert testimony and because jurors are greatly impacted by an 
experts’ testimony. 
However, one final reason has presented problems in trial: if a witness 
testifies without the specialized, scientific, or technical knowledge expected of 
an expert, how can the witness be sufficiently cross-examined?159 This issue is 
best demonstrated through a hypothetical. At a civil trial for a car accident, the 
plaintiff testifies, through his experience, the brakes in his car stop in about 
two seconds. However, when the defense cross-examines the plaintiff, he 
doesn’t know what type of brakes are in the car, how old his breaks are, how 
different speeds can affect the time it takes for the car to stop, and so on. While 
it may be true that everyday people who have been driving cars for years have 
some knowledge about car brakes, they do not have sufficient information to 
allow for cross-examination and thus for testimony in trial. In criminal trials, 
where a defendant has the constitutional right to confront, and therefore cross-
examine, all witnesses against him,160 this issue is even greater. Consequently, 
 
 151. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 152. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 589–90 (7th ed. 2012). 
 153. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See supra Part IV.A. 
 156. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note. 
 157. United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 384, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating “there is often an 
inherent danger with expert testimony unduly biasing the jury ‘[b]ecause of its aura of special 
reliability and trust.’”) (quoting United States v. Amaral 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 158. GRAHAM, supra note 152, at 589–637. 
 159. See Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 189 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). 
 160. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
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expert testimony is often necessary to allow for a sufficient opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness. 
C. Is a Police Officer a Valid Expert Due to Experience-Based Opinions? 
In light of these issues, courts are careful to distinguish between lay and 
expert testimony. Still, one difficulty arises when courts have to consider what 
is often termed “experience-based opinion.”161 Experience-based opinion, 
which was demonstrated above by the construction worker hypothetical, is 
where a witness has unusual experience-based knowledge not common to the 
everyday person, which would usually place their testimony in the expert 
category.162 However, because the witness obtained his or her knowledge and 
experience outside the realm of specialized training, courts have struggled to 
place this testimony under either lay or expert opinion.163 During a 2000 
amendment, the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee attempted to 
give guidance and noted that lay opinion is restricted to everyday reasoning.164 
But this raised a significant question for courts: what about police officers? 
Police officers know things through their “everyday reasoning” that others are 
incapable of understanding—should this knowledge be imparted through lay or 
expert opinion? 
While noting the line is difficult to draw, courts such as the Ninth Circuit 
in United States v. Figueroa-Lopez have recognized police officers can serve 
dual roles providing both lay and expert testimony since the late 1990s.165 In 
fact, some courts have allowed police officers to testify as lay witnesses “based 
upon their particularized knowledge garnered from years of experience within 
the field.”166 Thus, some courts are allowing police officers to testify without 
the reliability standards imposed on expert testimony and, as such, are 
potentially misguiding the jury with unreliable information. Further, as these 
officers often do not have training on the specialized, scientific, or technical 
aspects of cell towers, they are ill equipped to provide full testimony on both 
direct examination and cross-examination. 
 
 161. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Experience-Based Opinion Testimony: Strengthening the Lay 
Opinion Rule, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 551, 553 (2012). 
 162. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 163. Id. 
 164. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note. 
 165. United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 166. Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1223 
(11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Page, 521 F.3d 101, 105 (1st Cir. 2008); Wilder v. State, 991 
A.2d 172, 197 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); United States v. Feliciano, 300 F. App’x 795, 800–01 
(11th Cir. 2008). But see People v. Roby, No. 301608, 2011 WL 5067252, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Oct. 25, 2011) (holding the personal experience of the officer allowed him to be certified as an 
expert). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
506 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII:487 
V.  THE ADMISSION OF CELLULAR RECORDS USING LAY OR EXPERT 
TESTIMONY? COURTS EXPRESS CONFLICTING ANSWERS 
Even with guidance from the Federal Advisory Committee, which has 
attempted to make clear distinctions between lay and expert testimony, courts 
continue to struggle with finding the line between the two. When courts apply 
these evidentiary rules and principles to cellular records and cellular tower 
tracking technology, they almost invariably become stuck at the initial step in 
the distinction between lay and expert testimony: is this technology 
specialized, scientific, or technical? In fact, cases as far back as United States 
v. Sepulveda in 1997 have found this evidence sufficiently reliable and 
therefore admissible.167 While Sepulveda did not provide much rationale for 
admitting evidence surrounding cellular technology,168 just a few years later, in 
2000, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Pullin v. State, admitted cellular records, 
holding “the basic principles of cellular telephone technology [have been] 
widely accepted.”169 Further, the court in Pullin noted the technology had 
reached a sufficient stage of “verifiable certainty” and therefore was 
admissible.170 Consequently, there is little discussion over whether this 
evidence is admissible or even reliable.171 In fact, more recently courts have 
completely ignored contentions arguing that this evidence is either new or that 
the underlying science is questionable.172 Moreover, those courts examining 
the qualifications of an expert witness admitting expert opinion have allowed 
both a records custodian173 and police detective174 to testify. Thus, when the 
cell records are in fact admitted through an expert, the courts find few issues 
with the evidence.175 
 
 167. United States v. Sepulveda, 115 F.3d 882, 890 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 168. See id. 
 169. Pullin v. State, 534 S.E.2d 69, 71 (Ga. 2000). 
 170. Id. 
 171. United States v. Jones, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding “where the science 
is well understood . . . the court need not hold an evidentiary hearing” to determine the reliability 
of the science). 
 172. See People v. Wells, No. A112173, 2007 WL 466963, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 
2007) (stating “it is simply not true, as defendant contends, that the use of cell phones to locate a 
caller is new to the law. Cell phone evidence has been introduced for that purpose in a number of 
cases across the country. . . without any concern for the validity of the underlying science.”). 
 173. See Cooper v. State, 45 So. 3d 490, 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding custodian of 
cell records from cellular company qualified since, through his position, he had worked with the 
records and dealt with customer billing and technical support, and therefore he had knowledge of 
the interplay between the towers and transmission station). 
 174. See People v. Roby, No. 301608, 2011 WL 5067252, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 
2011) (holding detective who had only two-day training course qualified since that training was 
all that was available and, he had previously used this technology in past cases). 
 175. People v. Hammock, No. 277672, 2008 WL 4330176, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 
2008). 
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Consequently, the issue of cellular site data does not surround the actual 
technology or even the witness testifying regarding the validity of the 
evidence. Rather, courts have conflicting and often vague answers to the most 
basic question surrounding lay and expert testimony: is an expert even needed 
to admit cellular records and location information? More specifically, are 
cellular records and cellular tracking specialized, scientific, or technical 
information requiring an expert? To demonstrate the various conclusions 
courts have come to, this article will next conduct a case-study. This case-
study will begin first with a few key cases from various jurisdictions which 
provide sufficient rationale for analysis. Next, the case-study will conduct an 
in-depth analysis of Wilder v. Maryland, examining where the Maryland courts 
have drawn a line and subsequently leading a few other jurisdictions to follow 
Maryland’s steps. 
A. Expert Required vs. Lay Okay? Courts Present Uncertain Answers 
One such jurisdiction addressing cellular technology and the expertise 
involved is Nebraska. In State v. Robinson, the court examined a case where 
the defendant had been convicted of murder in the first degree.176 The 
defendant argued the admission of cellular records via a cellular provider’s 
employee was error because the records were technical and specialized and, as 
such, required a Daubert hearing.177 However, the court vehemently rejected 
this argument, stating the “records contained nothing even resembling expert 
opinion testimony . . . .”178 Further, the court found the employee simply 
explained cellular records, as his testimony was limited to only what the 
documents stated.179 Specifically, the court held the witness made no extension 
off the cellular records, and as such was merely conveying facts.180 However, 
during cross-examination at trial, the cellular employee went beyond the 
discussion of the records and simply explaining the facts.181 There, the 
employee began explaining how cell signals could be diverted from specific 
towers and various reasons for possible diversion.182 The processes of cell 
towers and the description of factors controlling a cell’s signal direction are 
beyond a simple explanation of what was contained in the cell records.183 Still, 
the court disregarded this information, rather they went on to state “even if [the 
 
 176. State v. Robinson, 724 N.W.2d 35, 48 (Neb. 2006). 
 177. Id. at 67–68. 
 178. Id. at 69. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 64. 
 182. Robinson, 724 N.W.2d at 64. 
 183. See Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 195 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). See also Ryan W. 
Dumm, Comment, The Admissibility of Cell Site Location Information in Washington Courts, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1473, 1480–81 (2013). 
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employee’s] testimony was based on ‘scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge,’ there is little doubt that it assisted the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence and that [the employee] would have been qualified as an 
expert.”184 Thus the court confused the issue and, rather than addressing the 
true nature of the testimony, fell back on the harmless-error standard of 
appellate review for evidentiary issues.185 By making such a decision, 
Robinson left future courts with little guidance. 
This confusion continued two years later in the Eleventh Circuit. In United 
States v. Feliciano, the court held a police detective’s testimony concerning the 
location of the defendant using cellular records was not expert testimony.186 In 
that case, the defendant was on trial for distribution of cocaine.187 During trial, 
the police detective testified about cell tower sites for the express purpose of 
establishing the location of the cellular phone and thereby the owner of that 
phone.188 The court, while specifically noting the testimonial purpose, found 
the detective’s testimony was properly admitted as a lay opinion since he 
simply reviewed the cellular records.189 In fact, as the court accepted the 
detective had no personal knowledge of cell towers beyond what he read in the 
cellular records, it simultaneously allowed the detective to testify to the 
location of the caller.190 Thus, rather than simply explaining documents to the 
jury in order to make the potentially complicated cell records more 
understandable, the police detective went beyond the records and testified that 
the cell towers were capable of indicating the caller’s location. Consequently, 
the Eleventh Circuit fell into the same trap as Nebraska, holding that since the 
detective did not provide an opinion beyond what he was capable of reading in 
the cell records, his testimony was not expert opinion.191 
This trap continued in the Florida courts as well. In Perez v. State, the 
defendant was on trial for attempted murder.192 At trial, the state called a 
cellular company’s records custodian to offer lay testimony demonstrating the 
defendant was in the “general” vicinity of the crime.193 The court upheld the 
admission of lay testimony, holding an expert was not necessary as the witness 
“simply factually explained the contents of the phone records.”194 Further, the 
court held the testimony was only general background information as it did not 
 
 184. Robinson, 724 N.W.2d at 69. 
 185. Id. 
 186. United States v. Feliciano, 300 Fed. App’x. 795, 801 (2008). 
 187. Id. at 797. 
 188. Id. at 801. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Perez v. State, 980 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 193. Id. at 1131. 
 194. Id. (quoting Gordon v. State, 863 So.2d 1215, 1219 (Fla. 2003)) 
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reveal the “precise” location of the defendant.195 Instead, the phone records 
gave the defendant’s general location, which was no more precise than a one–
three mile radius.196 While holding the witness only conveyed that which was 
in the cell records, the court also stated the testimony served to “explain the 
concept of a cell site and how it generally related to cellular telephone 
company records.”197 The court in Perez found that a juror’s own knowledge, 
experience, and familiarity with the addresses of cell towers could lead the 
juror to “determine the location of the tower without the need for the expert 
testimony.”198 However, assuming for the moment that lay persons understand 
cell towers and can locate them on a map, this does not mean a lay person 
would understand how that cell tower’s location then translates into the 
defendant’s location. It also does not mean a lay person understands the 
potential accuracy issues with that technology. However, the court in Perez 
still held the usage of cellular records to locate a defendant did not require 
expert testimony.199 
Lastly, the Missouri courts examined a peculiar factual twist in 
determining the necessity of an expert to admit cellular records, eventually 
holding the defendant was not an expert and therefore not able to testify 
regarding cellular tower technology. In State v. Manzella, during a first degree 
murder trial, the state introduced expert testimony through a cellular 
company’s employee.200 This employee was a radio frequency performance 
engineer working for Cingular Wireless, and he testified to the defendant’s 
location the morning of the murder using the cell records and tower 
information.201 The defendant did not appeal the admission of this evidence, 
rather the defendant argued he was denied an opportunity to testify himself 
about his cellular records.202 During trial, the defendant argued that he 
attempted to rebut the expert testimony by taking the stand himself, claiming 
through his many years as a cell phone owner, he held personal knowledge of 
cellular towers and therefore could testify as a lay witness.203 The appellate 
court upheld the trial court’s determination that, while the defendant could 
testify about his cellular bill (such as calls made and charges received), the 
defendant lacked sufficient knowledge of a cellular tower’s functioning.204 
Thus, ultimately the court, quoting the trial court’s reasoning, held that 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. (emphasis added). 
 198. Perez, 980 So. 2d at 1132. 
 199. Id. at 1131. 
 200. State v. Manzella, 128 S.W.3d 602, 608–09 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 201. Id. at 608. 
 202. Id. at 605. 
 203. Id. at 608–09. 
 204. Id. at 609. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
510 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII:487 
“testimony regarding cellular towers was outside the realm of common 
knowledge” and denied the admission of defendant’s lay testimony.205 While 
the court never expressly stated that an expert would be needed to admit the 
cellular records, it drew a line by prohibiting testimony from a witness who 
lacked sufficient knowledge of the technical information surrounding cellular 
towers.206 
This line became definite in the Missouri court’s most recent opinion, State 
v. Patton.207 There, the defendant had been convicted of several counts of 
murder in the first degree, armed criminal action, assault, and burglary.208 
During trial, several eye-witnesses and the defendant’s cell mate testified he 
was the assailant, but the defendant had an alibi in the form of his cousin and 
girlfriend, who testified he was out of town at the time of the murders.209 To 
combat this alibi, the state introduced the defendant’s cell records through the 
creation of a map which plotted the cell record’s information showing the 
location of each “ping.”210 Further, the state offered testimony from a lay 
witness who testified “that several factors affect whether a phone connects to a 
particular site, but a phone will usually connect to the closest one . . . .”211 The 
defendant appealed, arguing testimony regarding cell site data is too technical 
and scientific for a lay witness.212 The court made a clear distinction between 
the creation of a map using no more than the cell records and testifying to the 
location of the defendant.213 Specifically, once the witness testified to the 
ultimate connection between the ping’s location and the defendant’s location, a 
connection which is at the very least arguable and “misleadingly simple,” the 
testimony required an expert.214 Furthermore, drawing an inference that a 
person is located where their phone pings from a tower, “without the aid of 
specialized experience or knowledge in the field of cellular communications, 
[the testimony] comes too close to mere speculation.”215 Consequently, the 
court held any testimony regarding a person’s location using historical cell site 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Manzella, 128 S.W.3d at 609. 
 207. State v. Patton, No. ED 98051, 2013 WL 5530599, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2013). 
 208. Id. at *1. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at *4. 
 212. Id. at *2. 
 213. Patton, 2013 WL 5530599, at *4 (reasoning the creation of the map itself was not 
scientific and thus did not require a Frye hearing as the defendant claimed). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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data is beyond common knowledge and, as a result, requires expert 
testimony.216 
The Nebraska court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Florida court, and 
Missouri court provide general background and are just a few examples of the 
many jurisdictions currently grappling with the issue of cellular records and 
expert testimony.217 These cases demonstrate the confusion surrounding the 
distinction between lay and expert opinions when applied to cellular records. 
Further, they show the distinction many courts, like those of Nebraska, Florida, 
and the Eleventh Circuit, attempt to make between simply conveying the 
cellular records to the jury and explaining what those records then mean.218 In 
cases like Robinson, Feliciano, and Perez, courts have held the testimony only 
required the witnesses to read the records.219 However, since witnesses in all 
three cases not only read the records to the jury, but then drew the ultimate 
conclusion that the records could show the caller was in a specific location, 
these three courts have based their decisions on an incorrect reading of the trial 
records.220 
While many courts continue to base their holdings significantly on such an 
artificial distinction, the Maryland Court of Appeals drew a clear line and 
distinguished lay and expert testimony in regards to cellular technology.221 
Further, in making its decision, the court specifically examined both the state 
and defense pre-trial arguments.222 Ultimately, the Maryland court decided in 
Wilder v. State that an expert is required to admit cellular records when their 
sole purpose is to identify the defendant’s location during the crime alleged.223 
 
 216. Id. However, the conviction was not reversed since the court found the significant 
evidence and eye-witness testimony sufficient to support the conviction and, therefore, any error 
with the cell records was harmless. Id. at *5. 
 217. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d 949, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (holding an 
expert is necessary to explain how cellular networks operate, but lay testimony is okay when the 
witness only explains the call data records or the location of cell towers in relation to other 
locations relevant to the crime); United States v. Kale, 445 F. App’x 482, 485–86 (3d Cir. 2011) 
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Woodward v. State, 123 So. 3d 989, 1017 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (holding in a case of first 
impression for Alabama that an expert is not necessary to admit cellular records since the witness 
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CD, 2010 WL 5344882, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2010) (holding the detective offering 
lay testimony was not error since he merely testified to the cellular records and then plotted those 
locations on a map). 
 218. See supra Part V.A. 
 219. See supra notes 176–206 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 176–205 and accompanying text. 
 221. See Wilder v. Maryland, 991 A.2d 172, 197–98 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). 
 222. Id. at 188–91. 
 223. Id. at 197. 
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B. Wilder v. State: Where Does Maryland Draw the Line? 
1. Facts of Wilder 
In Wilder v. State, Audrey Wilder (“Defendant”) was convicted in 
Baltimore County, Maryland, of first degree assault, reckless endangerment, 
and use of a handgun in commission of a crime of violence.224 These charges 
stemmed from an early morning shooting on July 25, 2007, at the home of 
Robert Lee Williams Jr.225 While the incident happened in the very early 
morning, around 2:00 a.m., Williams Jr. saw the shooter’s car, which he 
identified as Defendant’s Volvo.226 However, Williams Jr. was unable to 
identify either the driver of the car or how many people occupied the 
vehicle.227 
At trial, the State primarily relied upon the contested cellular records and 
subsequent tower locations.228 Additionally, a neighbor, Troy Wallace, 
provided eyewitness testimony as he was awake at the time of the shooting.229 
However, just as William Jr. saw only the car, Wallace too was only able to 
identify the shooter’s car as the Defendant’s Volvo and did not see who was 
driving the vehicle.230 Furthermore, the State offered evidence demonstrating 
the long history of issues between Jones, a resident of William Jr.’s house, and 
Defendant.231 In fact, Defendant had been barred from coming to Williams 
Jr.’s property due to the severity of past “incidents” with Jones.232 
On the other hand, during the police investigation, Detective Hanna asked 
Defendant about his location during the shooting.233 Defendant stated that he 
was at a cousin’s house from 10:00 p.m. in the evening until he was arrested.234 
To support this position, the defense offered testimony from Dwayne 
McKenzie, Defendant’s cousin, who then provided an alibi for the 
Defendant.235 Lastly, Wilder’s mother took the stand to provide pictures of the 
 
 224. Id. at 176. 
 225. Id. at 176–77. 
 226. Id. at 178. 
 227. Wilder, 991 A.2d at 178. 
 228. Id. at 191. 
 229. Id. at 179. 
 230. Id. Wallace specifically stated he had seen the Defendant driving that Volvo on 
numerous occasions, thus bolstering William Jr.’s identification of Defendant’s car. Id. 
 231. Id. at 177–78. 
 232. Id. at 178–79. Over objection, the court allowed Williams Jr.’s wife to testify 
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Id. 
 233. Wilder, 991 A.2d at 180. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. McKenzie testified he went to clubs with Wilder late in the evening and early 
morning on the nights and early morning of the shooting. Further, he stated they went back to his 
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Volvo at night, thus demonstrating the difficulties of accurate identification.236 
Still, the jury found none of this evidence persuasive, ultimately finding the 
defendant guilty.237 
2. Defense vs. Prosecution: The Arguments for Expert Testimony on Cell 
Tower Technology 
During pre-trial evidentiary motions, the defense moved to exclude 
Detective Hanna’s lay testimony on the cell tower tracking technology.238 
Defendant did not challenge the reliability of the science, rather he argued the 
documents were hearsay and, in the alternative, an expert was needed to admit 
the records.239 Furthermore, Defendant stressed an inability to cross-examine a 
lay witness about significant issues surrounding cell tower tracking 
technology.240 Specifically, he argued a lay witness would be inept at 
explaining tower information, including where towers are located, how close 
the towers are to each other, and, most importantly, what controls which tower 
a cellular signal will ping.241 In opposition, the prosecution simply stated that 
Detective Hanna was “not going to render any opinion whatsoever, neither 
expert nor lay nor otherwise.”242 Moreover, the prosecution discussed the 
“mapping”243 Detective Hanna had completed for trial, arguing such technique 
only requires the witness to read the records.244 
The defense continued to point out there was more than simple “mapping” 
going on, arguing the prosecution was claiming Defendant was in the general 
location and such information was “highly technical.”245 Additionally, the 
defense noted the significance of this information in that the cellular records 
were “an extremely large part of the State’s case . . . because . . . no 
eyewitness . . . actually [saw Wilder] doing it.”246 However, the trial court 
 
home at about 4 a.m., and then McKenzie borrowed the car to take a companion home, returning 
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 236. Id. at 180. 
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 239. Wilder, 991 A.2d at 188–89. 
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 242. Id. at 190. 
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ultimately held the defense’s argument was “too sketchy” and admitted 
Detective Hanna’s lay testimony since the detective was not going to “express 
any opinion” but merely plot points on a map from certified records.247 
During trial, while the court had admitted the evidence under the 
assumption no opinion would be made, Detective Hanna’s testimony expressed 
location evidence numerous times.248 At the outset, Hanna testified that he 
“utilized the cellular telephone tracking to determine that Wilder was in the 
vicinity of the Williams home at the time of the shooting.”249 Further, Hanna 
testified the mapping exhibit he created from the cellular records depicted 
“Wilder’s whereabouts around the time of the shootings.”250 Next, Hanna 
indicated that this mapping tool had been used many other times as a 
“successful tool in locating or finding a lot about a person,” which indicates 
both that cellular towers show a specific location and that this tool has been 
used consistently and accurately.251 Finally, Hanna testified that the records 
showed Wilder’s phone was pinging off towers during the time and in the 
location of the shooting, rather than where his alibi witness claimed.252 Wilder 
was convicted as a result of this evidence and later appealed his conviction, 
claiming he was denied a fair trial through Hanna’s lay testimony.253 
2. Conviction Overturned: Expert is Necessary to Admit Cellular Records 
To reach a decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed several 
issues. Initially, they reviewed precedent from other jurisdictions cited by both 
parties, specifically Perez and Manzella.254 In examining this precedent, the 
court reviewed both the pre-trial motion arguments and trial testimony from 
the lay police officers. 255 Finally, the Maryland court also looked at the 
appellate standard of review for evidentiary issues—harmless error.256 
Ultimately, while the appellate court acknowledged precedent outside the 
Maryland jurisdictions, it expressly rejected that precedent and held an expert 
is necessary to admit cellular tracking technology.257 
In addressing contrary decisions surrounding expert testimony and cellular 
records, the court reviewed Perez, specifically noting the Florida court’s 
position that the lay witness simply explained contents of a phone record and 
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general background information interpreting the cell records.258 Further, the 
court addressed Manzella, noting the emphasis the Missouri court placed on 
the distinction between location technology and basic aspects of a cellular bill, 
such as calls made and charges to the carrier.259 Given these conflicting cases, 
the court in Wilder found that while cellular technology is becoming generally 
understood, the subject matter does not need to be “beyond the ken of laymen” 
for an expert to be necessary.260 Consequently, considering Detective Hanna’s 
“testimony implicated much more than mere telephone bills” since he 
expanded off the cellular records to ultimately suggest he knew Wilder’s 
location, the testimony required an expert.261 Specifically, the court held that 
Hanna’s procedure required specialized knowledge of cellular towers and was 
beyond the knowledge of a juror.262 Likewise, by using his training and 
experience while explaining the mapping procedure, Hanna should have been 
qualified as an expert.263 
Accordingly, Wilder held that the trial court should have required the 
prosecutor use an expert to admit cellular and mapping location testimony into 
evidence.264 However, before reversing the trial court’s decision, Wilder 
examined the harmless error standard of review against the trial court’s error in 
allowing the lay testimony.265 Given that the jury could have reasonably used 
this evidence in finding the defendant guilty, especially considering the alibi 
defense raised by the defendant, the trial court found the error was not 
harmless and required reversal.266 
In conclusion, the court noted that Hanna’s testimony “was used for the 
sole purpose of placing Wilder at or near the scene of the shooting . . . That, we 
believe, is compelling.”267 Consequently, the court in Wilder was careful to 
draw a distinction between simply reading records and expressing opinion 
from those records.268 Rather than allowing a lay witness to testify about 
cellular records he personally knew nothing about, the court mandated that an 
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expert witness testify to admit the highly technical cellular tracking 
technology.269 
VI.  ANALYSIS: EXPERT TESTIMONY NEEDED TO ADMIT CELLULAR TRACKING 
TECHNOLOGY 
As a result of Wilder, Maryland has become one of the few states with an 
absolute rule on cellular records.270 Wilder was correct to draw a line forcing 
courts to admit cellular records only through expert testimony. This is true for 
two significant reasons: first, the technology is specialized, scientific, and 
technical, and therefore is expert testimony; and second, lay witnesses are 
without sufficient information for the defense to cross-examine. 
First, and most significantly, tracking defendants through cellular records 
and cell site data is in fact specialized, scientific, and technical information. 
Cellular towers themselves are highly technical and are advancing. 
Furthermore, how cell towers work to create historical cell site data, and 
therefore a location of a caller, is even more complicated and requires a 
fundamental understanding of cellular towers’ functionality. While many lay 
persons own cell phones,271 it is unlikely they understand how cellular signals 
are transmitted to cell towers. Further, it is unlikely an average person either 
knows or understands how that cell tower transmits and records the signal. 
Finally, the average cell phone user is certainly not going to know the vast list 
of factors influencing how their cell phone pings to a specific tower.272 
Knowing how to use a cell phone and what a cell phone bill looks like does 
not qualify a person to testify about the technology beyond the basic cellular 
functions.273 This was made clear in Manzella, where the Missouri court held 
that a defendant was not qualified to testify to cellular tower technology simply 
because he was a cell phone user.274 This decision demonstrates how courts 
such as Nebraska in State v. Robinson, Florida in Perez v. State, and the 
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Feliciano, which allow lay testimony 
largely because no expertise is required to read a cellular record, are simply 
missing the point.275 While cellular records may contain location information, 
they do not contain a column stating “caller located at . . . .”276 In order to use 
cellular records to track a defendant, the witness must infer from those 
records—which only indicate a call pinged off a specific tower—that the caller 
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was in the same location as the tower.277 Such inferences require information 
above and beyond the cellular records themselves, contrary to Perez, 
Feliciano, and Robinson, and therefore require expert testimony.278 
Furthermore, these records are possibly the only evidence placing the 
defendant at the scene of the crime.279 In fact, in both cases there were alibi 
defenses,280 making the cellular records particularly critical. As such, the 
records provide a crucial piece of evidence for the state while the defense must 
attempt to cross a lay witness who lacks any knowledge of the technology’s 
failures. Such a situation highlights the second fundamental flaw with lay 
testimony on cellular records—the inability to cross examine the witness. 
While no confrontation issue is present,281 a defense attorney cannot ask a 
police officer, who has only read the cell records, any of the following 
questions: how does a cell tower receive a call? What factors influence what 
towers a call will ping off? How many towers are in the area? What are rush 
hours for this area? Is the tower in question owned by the same cell company 
as the caller? How many antennas are on the specific cell tower? How old is 
the cell tower? What kind of maintenance is done on the specific cell tower? 
Was maintenance happening on the day in question? All of these questions can 
have a significant impact on the weight a jury would give the evidence, and a 
lay witness is not qualified to answer them. 
Moreover, a prosecutor can benefit from calling an expert to testify. As 
previously mentioned, experts have a significant impact on a jury;282 therefore, 
any expert testimony could carry more weight simply because of the witness 
chosen to testify. Additionally, when a witness is asked any of the questions 
listed above and is then unable to answer, a jury could reasonably begin to 
question the witness. Picture a scenario where a witness is cross-examined and 
asked “what is a cell tower”? Now what if that witness has no idea? How does 
that impact the testimony they just gave on the cell records and mapping 
technique for locating the defendant? Such a situation demonstrates how a lay 
witness ignorance can damage not only the defense, but also the prosecution. 
Finally, an expert is more likely to understand new technological advances like 
those explained by Matthew Blaze.283 Such advances, according to Blaze, 
increase the accuracy of the cellular records.284 This information then cuts the 
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defense’s largest argument against the cell records in half since any inaccuracy 
argument losses steam once an expert testifies the records can accurately 
identify a person’s location up to a specific floor of a particular building. 
As a result, not only is an expert witness required to testify about the 
highly technical cellular towers, but prosecutors benefit from such testimony 
just as the defense benefits. Specifically, contrary to courts’ decisions in 
Florida and Nebraska, being a cell phone user does not mean the person 
understands the cell phone technology. Just because a person can turn on their 
phone does not mean they then understand historical cell site data, mapping, or 
cellular towers. What’s more, experts allow for complete cross-examination, 
and consequently they provide complete testimony creating a greater impact on 
a jury. Therefore, Maryland was correct in Wilder v. State to draw a line 
limiting lay testimony on cell towers and to require an expert to admit cell site 
data through cellular records. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
As each month passes, courts continue to encounter this precise question, 
and they continue to find conflicting answers.285 Furthermore, many of these 
cases are being denied appellate review.286 Given that cellular records can 
sometimes supply the only piece of evidence tying a defendant to a particular 
location at a particular time, the evidence is of critical importance at trial. As 
constitutional and most evidentiary arguments continue to find little success, 
courts will continue to debate lay testimony versus expert testimony regarding 
the use of cell phone records as a locator device. However, because this 
evidence is specialized and technical, it should be reserved to an expert 
witness. By reserving cellular tower information to an expert, those like 
Defendant above287 will be ensured their constitutional right to a fair trial. 
ALEXANDRA WELLS* 
 
 
 285. See cases cited supra note 217. 
 286. See, e.g., State v. Hayes, No. M2008-02689-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 5344882, at *1 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2010), reh’g denied (May 25, 2011); Woodward v. State, No. CR-08-
0145, 2011 WL 6278294, at *1 (Ala. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2011); Saenz v. State, No. 13-10-
00216-CR, 2011 WL 578757, at *1 (Tex. App. Feb. 17, 2011); People v. Roby, No. 301608, 2011 
WL 5067252, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011). 
 287. See supra Part I. 
* JD, Saint Louis University School of Law, anticipated May 2014; BA Political Science, Saint 
Louis University, 2011. The Author must extend her sincerest appreciation to Professor Karen 
Sanner as this Comment would not have been possible without her support and guidance 
throughout the Author’s law school career. The Author would also like to thank both Carolyn 
Wells and Claire Markus, who have taught her the true meaning of family—endurance. 
